By  Lyllian Simerly and Jamie Strawbridge

The Supreme Court recently affirmed a more wholistic approach for considering whether police officers’ actions are reasonable in the context of excessive force claims. Although this decision may help some plaintiffs in § 1983 lawsuits against police, plaintiffs with disabilities nonetheless should consider adding claims under disability-rights statutes in light of those statutes’ distinct advantages.

In Barnes v. Felix, the Supreme Court struck down the “moment-of-threat” test used by the Fifth Circuit in excessive force cases. Under that now-defunct test, the Fifth Circuit looked only at the brief window in time in which a police officer used force when determining if that force was reasonable. That test could produce absurd results where, for instance, an officer’s unreasonable actions escalated an encounter such that using force became “reasonable.” By rejecting this framework, the Supreme Court affirmed a broader “totality of the circumstances” analysis, which asks whether force was reasonable based on the entire interaction. Many other circuits already used the “totality of the circumstances” approach.

In theory, the Barnes decision helps victims of police violence (in the Fifth Circuit and a few others, at least) prevail on excessive force claims under § 1983. But excessive force claims continue to face myriad other court-imposed barriers, which is why, for disabled plaintiffs, the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act continue to offer distinct advantages and may be a better route to achieving justice.

Excessive Force Claims Under § 1983

Ashtian Barnes was pulled over by Officer Roberto Felix for a suspected toll violation. After pulling over, Barnes informed Officer Felix that he believed his identification was in the trunk of his vehicle. While Officer Felix walked toward the back of the car, Barnes started the ignition and began to drive away. Felix then jumped onto the doorsill of the moving vehicle and fired his gun into the car, killing Barnes. His mother sued on his behalf.

On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, the court focused only on the mere seconds of time in which Officer Felix was standing on the doorsill, finding that in those two seconds, he could have reasonably believed that his life was in danger such that deadly force was justified. It didn’t matter to the Fifth Circuit why Officer Felix chose to jump onto the doorsill because that was outside the relevant timeframe of inquiry (i.e., not within the “moment-of-threat”).

The “moment-of-threat” test was an outlier, as it was only used by a minority of circuit courts. Most circuit courts—following Supreme Court precedent in cases like Graham v. Connor—examined whether an officer’s actions were objectively reasonable under a totality-of-the-circumstances test, meaning the analysis was not limited to the “moment of threat” but instead could consider a broader array of facts. In Barnes, the Supreme Court affirmed its prior decision in Graham and found that a totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry has no strict temporal limitation.

But §1983 excessive-force claims continue to face significant hurdles—notwithstanding the outcome in Barnes—as compared to claims under the ADA or Section 504. For example, although in § 1983 claims officers are shielded from liability by qualified immunity, that doctrine does not apply in ADA/504 cases. It can also be easier to obtain systemic injunctive relief in disability rights cases as compared to § 1983 cases.

The ADA as a Path Toward Systemic Change

Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act prohibit public entities and federally funded entities (such as police departments) and their employees from discriminating based on a person’s disability. That means the ADA and Section 504 require, among other things, that police officers and other emergency personnel provide reasonable accommodations to, and ensure effective communication with, people with disabilities.

In cases involving excessive force, plaintiffs may bring claims under the ADA and Section 504 if, during the course of a police encounter, police fail to offer reasonable accommodations and that failure caused the individual to suffer greater harm than non-disabled individuals would face. Crucially, limitations on § 1983 claims (such as qualified immunity) don’t apply to the ADA, which means it can be easier for plaintiffs to survive motions to dismiss. Additionally, whereas § 1983 claims tend to focus on individual officers’ actions, ADA/504 claims allow the plaintiff to focus more squarely on the government entity itself and on issues like police policies and training—opening the door to potentially broader injunctive relief.

A Ninth Circuit case, Vos v. City of Newport Beach, illustrates this distinction between disability-rights claims and excessive-force claims. There, police responded to a 911 call from a 7-Eleven employee reporting a disturbance. Despite numerous indicators that Mr. Vos was experiencing a mental health crisis, police did not attempt to deescalate the situation or get Mr. Vos access to mental health services. Instead, they used deadly force. Mr. Vos’s parents sued on his behalf. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision that qualified immunity barred the excessive force claim under § 1983. However, the court found that the ADA claims were cognizable because the officers had time to “assess the situation and potentially employ [] accommodations” but nonetheless failed to take such actions.

Notwithstanding the recent decision in Barnes, the ADA continues to offer distinct advantages for disabled individuals who are victims of police violence and their families and offers a way for plaintiffs to achieve real reform by holding these departments accountable for their failure to provide reasonable accommodations.

The team at Brown, Goldstein & Levy are fierce advocates for individuals with disabilities and their families. If you or a loved one has been subject to police misconduct, consider contacting us today to discuss your situation.

This blog was primarily authored by BGL summer associate Lyllian Simerly. At the time of publication, Lyllian is a rising 3L at the University of Michigan Law School, where she is a Student Attorney for the Civil Rights Litigation Initiative. She is also an Articles Editor for the Michigan Law Review and a Senior Law Judge for the 1L Legal Practice Program. Last summer, she interned with the Michigan Poverty Law Program where she performed legal and policy research in the Family Law division.